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Social mobility has become the central focus of education policy amongst many poli-
ticians and commentators, egged on by the Sutton Trust and Social Mobility Commis-
sion. Much of what they say is based on a superficial understanding of the concept.
When I helped set up a free school in a low-income part of London, I was told I was 
trying to improve social mobility. When I worked for independent schools I was accused 
of educating my pupils well and so limiting social mobility. What did that mean?
‘Social mobility’ means people moving up or down the social classes – being 
better off or worse off than their parents. Social mobility matters, because if able 
children from poor backgrounds cannot do well we waste human potential. It is 
bad for the individuals concerned and it is bad for the country.
It also matters because if people feel that there is social immobility there will 
be understandable envy of those who have done well. It results in social tension 
and potential unrest.
It matters politically because meritocracy is today a central creed of all 
Britain’s main political parties. When the Labour peer Michael Young wrote The 
Rise of the Meritocracy in 19581 he defined it as ability plus effort. He was using 
the term pejoratively . . . but today meritocracy is certainly not regarded as 
anathema. In its more frequently heard formulation, ‘equality of opportunity’, it is 
something to which no one dare admit opposition.
On the day that Theresa May became the British Prime Minister in 2016, she 
addressed the country:
When it comes to opportunity, we won’t entrench the advantages of the 
fortunate few, we will do everything we can to help anybody, whatever your 
background, to go as far as your talents will take you.
That was a call for greater social mobility.
IS THERE SOCIAL IMMOBILITY IN THE UK?
A tricky question. It depends a bit on how you measure it, and all definitions, such 
as ‘working class’ or ‘professional and management class’, are challengeable. And 
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it depends on the timescale you look at: the average temperature may be going up 
if you look at the past 50 years but down if you just look at the past two years.
SOCIOLOGISTS DON’T AGREE
There is some evidence that social mobility is lower now than in the 1950s, when 
the economy was changing in a way which produced more middle-class jobs. Jo 
Blanden and Stephen Machin at the London School of Economics2 tracked the 
lives of children born in one week in 1958 and another cohort born in a week in 
1970, and found the latter exhibited less social mobility. Abigail McKnight (2015)3 
studied 17,000 children born in 1970 whose intelligence was measured when 
they were five, finding that by age 42 those with low ability from higher- 
income families were earning more than high-ability children from low-income 
families.
This led to an academic debate as Blanden and Machin’s findings were 
challenged by several subsequent studies. Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007)4 found 
that relative mobility for both men and women remained ‘essentially constant’ in 
the post-war era, and when Goldthorpe and Mills (2008)5 studied data from 1972 
and 2005, they found that social mobility had not declined. So did Paterson and 
Iannelli (2007)6, Lambert et al. (2007)7 and others. Some found that relative 
mobility had actually improved, including Heath and Payne (2000)8 and Li and 
Devine (2011).9 All these authors tend to agree with John Goldthorpe’s summary 
2 Blanden, J. & Machin, S., (2007), Recent Changes in Intergenerational Mobility in 
Britain, Sutton Trust.
3 McKnight, A. (2015), Downward mobility, opportunity hoarding and the glass floor, 
Social Mobility Commission.
4 Goldthorpe, J. & Jackson, M. (2007) Intergenerational class mobility in contemporary 
Britain: political concerns and empirical findings, British Journal of Sociology, 58.
5 Goldthorpe, J. & Mills, C. (2008) ‘Trends in Intergenerational Class Mobility in Modern 
Britain. Evidence from National Surveys, 1972–2005’, National Institute Economic 
Review, 205(1).
6 Paterson, L. & Iannelli, C. (2007) Patterns of absolute and relative social mobility: a 
comparative study of England, Wales and Scotland, Sociological Research Online, 12(6).
7 Lambert, P., K. Prandy and W. Bottero, 2008, ‘By slow degrees: two centuries of social 
reproduction and mobility in Britain’, Sociological Research Online, 13(1)
8 Heath, A. and C, Payne. (2000) ‘Social Mobility’, in A. H. Halsey with J. Webb (eds.) 
Twentieth-Century British Social Trends, Macmillan.
9 Li, Y. & F, Devine. (2011) ‘Is social mobility really declining? Intergenerational class 
mobility in Britain in the 1990s and the 2000s’, Sociological Research Online, 16(3).
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that ‘no decline in mobility, either absolute or relative, occurred in the late 
20th century’ (Goldthorpe, 2012).10
Yet in October 2015 David Cameron could say: ’Britain has the lowest social 
mobility in the developed world.’ No such conclusion can be derived from the evidence.
In his text Social Mobility Myths (2010), Peter Saunders,11 former professor of 
sociology at Sussex University, claimed that social mobility in the UK was high. 
‘Four out of five children who grow up in poor households escape poverty in 
adulthood. Social mobility is the norm in Britain, not the exception.’
There is plenty of evidence that many people do better than their parents, but 
few move from low to high income in the course of just one generation. So of those 
born in 1970, 63 per cent of those with parents in the poorest 25 per cent escaped 
low income as adults. However, most of this mobility was short-range and only one 
in seven reached the top 25 per cent as adults. This contrasts with those with parents 
in the richest 25 per cent, almost 45 per cent of whom remained there as adults.
In 2019 Peter Saunders published Social Mobility Truths.12 According to the 
Office for National Statistics’ 2018 Labour Force Survey,13 26% were born into 
working-class families, half the number of those born in the 1940s, 37% were 
born into professional and managerial classes, 2.5 times as many as in the 1940s. 
65% of those born into the working class had moved up in social class and 40% of 
those born into professional and managerial had moved down.
Of those born in the working class, 34% had leapfrogged the intermediate 
class and had gone into professional and managerial jobs.
So social mobility was high, even though upward mobility is becoming less 
common because so many are already middle class now. More people are dropping 
down than in the past, because more people are in positions from which it is 
possible to fall and fewer in positions from which it is possible to rise.
It is of course true that people born to middle-class parents are more likely than 
those born to working-class parents to end up in professional/managerial positions. 
But Saunders suggests it is not true that working-class children find it ‘very difficult’ 
to get access to these higher-level jobs: in 2018 more than one third of the people 
doing them had come from working-class backgrounds (Saunders, 2019).14
10 Goldthorpe, J. (2012) Understanding – and misunderstanding – social mobility in 
Britain: the entry of the economists, the confusion of politicians and the limits of 
educational policy, Barnet Papers in Social Research, Department of Social Policy and 
Intervention, Oxford.
11 Saunders, P. (2010) Social Mobility Myths, Civitas.
12 Saunders, P. (2019) Social Mobility Truths, Civitas.
13 Office for National Statistics, (2018) Labour Force Survey.
14 Ibid.
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Yet the Sutton Trust and the Social Mobility Commission continue to claim 
that social mobility is not only low but worse than it has ever been. And in 2012 
Michael Gove could say: ‘Those who are born poor are more likely to stay poor, 
and those who inherit privilege are more likely to pass on privilege, in England 
than in any comparable country. For those of us who believe in social justice, this 
stratification and segregation are morally indefensible’ (Hurst, 2012).15
WHAT ABOUT ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE?
Achievement in school is relevant because access to middle-class jobs is often 
dependent on educational qualifications.
PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment) is funded by the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). The 
programme started in 2000 with tests happening every three years. PISA tests are 
computer-based, administered to a sample of 15-year-olds in each country and cover 
reading, science and mathematics; 15-year-olds are chosen because at this age most 
children in most OECD countries are reaching the end of compulsory education.
The PISA 2018 tests16 found that the UK schools were quite good for equity: 
disadvantaged pupils and the children of immigrants do better than in many 
countries. For example, 14% of disadvantaged students scored in the top quarter of 
performance in reading, indicating, as they said, that ‘disadvantage is not destiny’. 
Socio-economic status only explained 12% of the variation in mathematics 
performance in PISA 2018 in the United Kingdom (compared to 14% on average 
across OECD countries), and 11% of the variation in science performance 
(compared to the OECD average of 13% of the variation).
BUT WE KNOW THAT EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT GAPS 
REMAIN WIDE
Poor children not only start school at a lower base, but also make less progress while 
they are there. The attainment of wealthier children accelerates during their school 
years, while it stalls for the poorest. This means that wealthier children exceed their 
educational potential, but some of the poorest do not get near to fulfilling theirs.
Having said all that, the link between poverty and academic outcomes is not 
as great as is often claimed. Of the bottom 20 per cent of pupils academically at 
age 16, only a quarter are on free school meals. Of those on free school meals only 
15 Hurst, G. ‘Domination by private schools is indefensible, declares Gove’ The Times 
11 May 2012.
16 PISA, (2019), Results from PISA 2018 country report: United Kingdom.
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a third are in the bottom 20 per cent. So the pupil premium, which is designed to 
raise the academic achievement of poorer pupils, misses two thirds of those in the 
bottom 20 per cent academically.
The data below shows the 2019 GCSE results in England. The biggest 
attainment gaps are between pupils with special needs and those without. Gaps 
between disadvantaged pupils/those on free school meals and those who are not 
are quite large. Girls do a bit better than boys. Incredibly, those whose first 
language is not English did better than those whose first language was Englsh.
Average GCSE Attainment 8 score by pupil characteristcis, 2019
Source: DfE Key stage 4 performance, 2019
SOME DEFINITIONS
Special Educational Needs (SEN)
SEN indicates whether a pupil has learning difficulties or disabilities that make it 
harder for them to learn than most children of the same age. Pupils with special 
educational needs include those with SEN support, with statements of SEN or an 
education, health and care (EHC) plan. 14.2% of pupils at the end of Key Stage 4 
had a special educational need in 2019.
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Disadvantaged pupils
Pupils are defined as disadvantaged if they are known to have been eligible for 
free school meals in the past six years (from year 6 to year 11), if they are record-
ed as having been looked after for at least one day or if they are recorded as 
having been adopted from care. In 2019, 26.5% of pupils in state-funded schools 
at the end of Key Stage 4 were disadvantaged.
Free School Meals
Parents do not have to pay for school lunches if they receive any of the 
following:
Income Support
Income-based Jobseekers Allowance
Income-related Employment and Support Allowance
Support under Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
The guaranteed element of State Pension Credit
Child Tax Credit (provided they are not also entitled to Working Tax Credit 
and have an annual gross income of no more than £16,190)
Working Tax Credit run-on – paid for 4 weeks after a person stops qualifying 
for Working Tax Credit
Universal Credit – with household income of less than £7,400 a year (after tax 
and not including any benefits)
The English Baccalaureate (EBacc)
This measures achievement in core academic subjects at Key Stage 4. The EBacc is 
made up of five pots: English, maths, science, a language and history or geography.
Attainment 8
Attainment 8 measures the average achievement of pupils in up to 8 qualifica-
tions. This includes: English (double-weighted if both GCSEs in language and 
literature are taken); maths (double weighted); three further qualifications that 
count in the English Baccalaureate (EBacc); and three further qualifications that 
can be GCSE qualifications (including EBacc subjects) or any other non-GCSE 
qualifications on the DfE approved list. Points are allocated to the new GCSEs 
on a 9 to 1 score scale corresponding to the 9 to 1 grades, for example a grade 9 
will get 9 points in the performance measures.
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Progress 8
Progress 8 measures the progress a pupil makes from the end of Key Stage 2 
(KS2) to the end of KS4. It compares pupils’ achievement – their Attainment 
8 score – with the national average Attainment 8 score of all pupils who had a 
similar starting point (or ‘prior attainment’), calculated using assessment results 
from the end of primary school. Progress 8 is a relative measure, therefore the 
national average Progress 8 score is very close to zero.
ETHNICITY
Over the years there has been great social mobility in terms of different ethnic 
groups, but with further to go.
Looking at individual ethnic groups in terms of GCSE results, since 2004:
• Indian and Chinese students have moved way ahead of white British.
• Bangladeshi students have moved from well below to above white British 
despite being amongst the most socio-economically deprived.
• Black African students have moved from below white British to being better.
• Black Caribbean and Pakistani students caught up and are now quite similar to 
white British, a bit below for those not on FSMs, a bit above for those on FSMs.
The GCSE scores for 2019 GCSEs show the pattern:
White Mixed Asian Black Chinese 
End of key stage 4 cohort
2018 396,680 24,646 55,737 28,949 1,875
2019 406,708 27,018 58,111 31,175 2,006
Progress 822
2018
2019
-0.10
(-0.11 to -0.10)
-0.02
(-0.03 to 0.00)
0.45
(0.44 to 0.46)
0.12
(0.11 to 0.14)
1.03
(0.97 to 1.09)
-0.11
(-0.12 to -0.11)
0.00
(-0.02 to 0.01)
0.47 
(0.45 to 0.48) 
0.13
(0.12 to 0.15)
0.86
(0.80 to 0.92)
EBacc entry
2018 36.0% 41.8% 48.5% 45.0% 63.6% 
2019 37.5% 44.3% 50.6% 46.5% 61.6%
Achieving English and mathematics (at grades 9-5)
2018 42.6% 43.7% 50.2% 38.8% 75.3%
2019 42.4% 43.8% 51.9% 37.8% 76.3%
Attainment 8
2018 46.1 47.3 50.4 45.0 64.2
2019 46.1 47.6 51.2 44.9 64.3
EBacc average point score
2018 3.98 4.14 4.48 3.93 6.01
2019 4.00 4.19 4.57 3.94 5.99
Source: Key stage 4 attainment data 
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If you just look at pupils entitled to FSMs, all ethnic groups do better than 
white British, and the gap is growing. This is true with both the Key Stage 2 
results at age 11 and GCSE results at age 16:
Progress 8 score 2019 GCSEs, FSM pupils by ethnicity
Chinese  .......................... 0.66
Indian  ............................. 0.34
Pakistani  ........................ 0.03
Black Caribbean  ...........-0.54
White British  .................-0.78
As for university entry, English state school pupils in the Chinese ethnic group 
have the highest entry rate to higher education (68.0%), while those from the 
White ethnic group have the lowest (30.3%) (UCAS end of cycle report 2019).17
There are substantial differences in workforce participation by ethnicity 
between and within genders. In 2017, white British working-age women were only 
7 percentage points less likely to be employed than white British men (73% compared 
with 80%). But among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, the employment rate of 
women was around half that of men (38% compared with 71% (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2018).18 In 2014, Bangladeshi and Pakistani women earned 
£1–1.50 less per hour on average than white British women, and these gaps appear 
to have widened over the past decade (Longhi and Brynin, 2017).19
So, in Britain it is hard to disentangle class, ethnicity and gender.
GENDER
The table below shows 2019 GCSE data for boys and girls in England:
17 UCAS, (2019), End of cycle report.
18 Race Disparity Audit, 2018, gov.uk website, Department of Work and Pensions.
19 Longhi, S. and Bynin, M. (2017) The ethnicity pay gap. Equality and Human Rights.
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Social mobility has improved for women due to the general rise in women in work, 
an increase in middle-class women returning to work following childbirth and more 
women attending university, unlocking senior jobs in areas like law and medicine.
Although the massive expansion in university places after 2000 was supposed 
to provide the ladder of opportunity for the working classes, most of these extra 
places have been taken by middle-class girls.
Applications to university from 18-year-olds for 2020 entry showed 46.4% per 
cent of young women applied but only 33% of young men, with the gap growing 
(UCAS, 2020).
The expansion of the universities is also part of the reason why the less able 
children from the higher-income families have not moved down socially, as a truly 
meritocratic model would suggest they should. Less able children of wealthier 
families go to university in a way they did not before 1997.
The expansion in the numbers of middle-class children going to university 
also increased assortative mating – the number of graduate women marrying 
graduate men. And assortative mating is one of the things which can reduce social 
mobility because the less educated are left to pair off with each other.
It is unlikely that we can return to earlier high levels of upward social mobility 
by boosting education and training. Increasing the number of people with paper 
qualifications does nothing to expand the number of middle-class positions 
available for them to fill. Education helps individuals become socially mobile, but 
does not in itself create more mobility. Only an increase in middle-class jobs does 
that (Saunders, 2019).
Per cent of 15-year-old pupils who entered Higher Education by age 19 by gender, 
2009–18
Source: DfE, 2019, Widening Participation in Higher Education, England.
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INCOME INEQUALITY
For much of the past 100 years the distribution of wealth has been getting more 
equal. In 1923 the top 1 per cent of the population owned 61 per cent of marketa-
ble assets. By 1976, this had dropped dramatically so they owned only 21 per cent 
(Snowden, 2015).20
The Office for National Statistics measures income inequality in the UK using 
the Gini coefficient, where 0 means total equality and 100 means total inequality 
(one person has all the income). The graph below shows that inequality rose in the 
1980s, then fell back, with a small rise in the past ten years.
Source: Office for National Statistics Statistical Bulletin
But the share of income going to the 1% richest households has nearly tripled 
in the last four decades, from 3% in the late 1970s to around 8% today. International 
comparisons of a related measure – the top 1% share of individual gross incomes – 
suggest that top income shares have also risen in other English-speaking countries 
such as the US and Canada, but have remained more stable in continental European 
countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2016).21
20 Snowden, C. (2015) Income inequality: the facts, IEA.
21 Roser, M. and Ortiz-Ospina, E. (2016) Income inequality, Our World in Data.
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Top 1% share of net household income, 1961–2017
Source: Inequalities in the Twenty-first Century: Introducing the IFS Deaton Review, 
2019, Robert Joyce and Xiaowei Xu, The Institute for Fiscal Studies
It is not true that the poor are getting poorer. The bottom 20 per cent of earners 
have a disposable income that is 86 per cent higher, adjusted for inflation, than in 
1977 (ONS 2016).22 The average real income in 2017 was twice what it was in 1977.
There is a danger of governments prioritising inequality as an issue at the 
expense of economic growth or the relief of poverty. It is possible for inequality 
to fall as living standards for everyone drop – as happened in the UK in recent 
years. In China inequality has risen in the past two decades, but everyone is 
much better off than they were.
GEOGRAPHY
Another form of between-group inequality that has become increasingly salient in 
the public debate is geographic inequality. The Brexit vote focused attention on 
the growing divide between London and the rest of the country. Whilst the major-
ity of people in all other English regions voted for Brexit, 60% of Londoners voted 
22 Office for National Statistics (2016) Families and Households in the UK.
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in favour of Remain. This political divide is likely to at least partly reflect growing 
economic divides between London – a global city with booming finance, media 
and professional services – and other parts of the UK.
Over the past few decades, London has pulled away from the rest of the 
country. Real economic output (measured by gross value added) grew by 3.1% 
a year in London on average between 1998 and 2017, compared with 1.9% in 
the UK as a whole (Office for National Statistics, 2018).23 Average weekly 
earnings among full-time employees in London are a third higher than the UK 
average and nearly two-thirds higher than in the North East, though high living 
(especially housing) costs mean that Londoners’ real living standards are not 
as high as raw income differentials suggest (Office for National Statistics, 
2019).24
Recent research has found that opportunities for social mobility are also higher 
in the capital. A child growing up in London to parents in the bottom third of the 
occupation distribution (in terms of median wages) has a 30% chance of moving to 
the top third, compared with 22% nationally and only 17% in Yorkshire and the 
Humber (Bell, Blundell and Machin, 2018).25
There are also geographical variations in some of the patterns in family 
structure discussed below. Only 7% of children in affluent Windsor and 
Maidenhead are born to single mothers, compared with a third of children in 
Liverpool and Middlesbrough (Office for National Statistics, 2019).
The Social Mobility Commission (2016)26 found that over one fifth of the 
children in failing schools in England live in ten local authority areas (Blackpool, 
Knowsley, Northumberland, Doncaster, Reading, Stoke-on-Trent, Oldham, 
Bradford, Telford and Wrekin and Central Bedfordshire).
In 2019 only 29.8 per cent of 18-year-olds in the south-west of England went to 
university, 30.2 per cent from the north-east, but 44.5 per cent from London 
(UCAS, 2019).27
London is a hotspot for social mobility in comparison to other parts of England. 
Inner London has the highest proportion of pupils eligible for Free School Meals 
(26%, twice the national average). Despite this, schools in Inner London had the 
23 Office for National Statistics (2018).
24 Office for National Statistics (2019).
25 Bell, B. Blundell, J. and Machin, S. (2018), The changing geography of intergenerational 
mobility, CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics and Political Science.
26 Social Mobility Commission, (2019), State of the Nation 2019 report.
27 UCAS, (2019).
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highest performance in the country at GCSE, with the lowest attainment gap 
between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils.
There is a brain drain to London. Swinney and Williams (2016)28 found that 
London accounts for around 19 per cent of UK jobs, but six months after 
graduation, of the graduates who moved city, London employed 22 per cent of all 
working new graduates, and 38 per cent of those working new graduates with a 
first or upper-second-class degree from a Russell Group university. This figure 
rises to 52 per cent for Oxbridge graduates with a first or 2:1. London also has by 
far the highest graduate retention and return rates, with 77 per cent of London 
students staying to work in the capital and 74 per cent of those who left to become 
undergraduates elsewhere returning.
THE PROBLEM OF TIME LAGS
By definition you have to wait one generation to tell whether a group is experienc-
ing social mobility. So even if improvement in state schools is creating good 
conditions for social mobility right now, we will not be able to prove it for some 
years.
Equally you cannot judge the prospects for social mobility of today’s young 
people from the circumstances of those currently aged 40 or more, yet many of 
those who commentate on current conditions refer back to people born before 
1960 (the number of privately educated judges etc.).
THE PROBLEM OF THE TOP 0.001 PER CENT
The Social Mobility Commission keep reminding us that 71 per cent of senior 
judges and 62 per cent of senior Armed Forces officers went to private school.
But it could also be a mistake to measure social mobility by looking at the 
background of senior judges, senior Armed Forces officers, Oscar-winning actors 
or members of the Cabinet. Because what really matters is not only what happens 
to the top 0.001 per cent but what happens to the rest.
In the February 2020 Cabinet 69 per cent was privately educated compared to 
7 per cent of population, 27 per cent were women as against 51 per cent of the 
population, 50 per cent had been to university at Oxford or Cambridge compared 
to 1 per cent of the population.
But what did that tell us about social mobility in the country as a whole?
28 Swinney, P. and Williams, M. (2016), The Great British Brain Drain: where graduates 
move and why, Centre for Cities.
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WHAT CAUSES SOCIAL IMMOBILITY?
One could write a book about the causes of social immobility and many people 
have. Here are just a few causes . . . 
1. Upbringing
According to the annual Department for Education poll of parents (DfE, Child-
care and Early Years Survey of Parents in England, 2019)29 many parents feel 
schools and childcare providers are responsible for teaching their children to 
speak, rather than themselves.
Almost a quarter (23 per cent) of parents who earn under £20,000 a year felt 
that teaching children up to the age of five to speak was not their responsibility. 
This compared to 16 per cent of families earning up to £44,999 a year and just six 
per cent of those earning £45,000 and over.
In the UK a significant proportion of children (16% in 2017) are born into 
households with no fathers (Office for National Statistics, 2019), concentrated 
among those with less income and education.
Children of wealthier, more educated parents grow up in stable homes with 
parents who spend both time and money on them, whilst children from poorer 
backgrounds increasingly grow up in insecure homes.
In the UK, as in the US, low-income and lower-educated people are increasingly 
likely to live alone (without a spouse or cohabiting partner). Amongst the better-off 
the proportion of people who were either married or cohabiting increased between 
1994 and 2015, but it declined by up to 20% among people in the bottom fifth of 
wages (Blundell et al., 2018).30 In 1993, graduates were no more likely to live in a 
couple at age 40–45 than those without degrees; the gap now stands at around 
10 percentage points.
29 Department for Education, (2019), Childcare and Early Years Survey of Parents in 
England, 2019
30 Blundell, R. Joyce, J. Norris, A. Keiller, J. Ziliak, P. (2018), Income inequality and the 
labour market in Britain and the US, Journal of Public Economics
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Share of 40-to 45 year olds who are married or cohabiting by education 1993–2018
Source: Inequalities in the Twenty-first Century: Introducing the IFS Deaton Review, 
2019, Robert Joyce and Xiaowei Xu, The Institute for Fiscal Studies
2. Where you go to school?
The quality of schools in England is variable. Schools that are apparently similar 
in terms of relative deprivation of area or disadvantage of intake can perform very 
differently. The large urban centres that were once the weakest performing are 
now among the strongest. Poorer children are more likely to attend worse schools, 
especially at secondary level, which doubles their disadvantage. Weak schools 
find it harder to attract good teachers, and this makes improvement much more 
difficult.
At the international level, PISA results suggest that segregation of schools by 
income tends to depress the scores of the already disadvantaged. Countries with 
lower segregation between schools, more egalitarian systems and low achievement 
gaps tend to have higher average attainment and also the highest percentage of 
very skilled students.
The existence of an independent or private sector in schooling increases 
segregation by family income. But the Sutton Trust investigation of this issue 
concluded that ‘most of the segregation of pupils by social class occurs within the 
state sector’. A recent Sutton Trust report (Selective Comprehensives: Great 
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Britain, 2019)31 found that the top comprehensives across Britain take half the 
number of poorer pupils than the average school, and ‘while these schools are, by 
and large, not using forms of overt selection, they are, in effect, exercising covert 
selection’.
We know that most of the schools with the best exam results are in middle-
class areas and tend to push up house prices, making access to such schools 
impossible for all but the most prosperous. In 2016 Lloyds Bank research looked 
at 30 state schools with good GCSE results and found that local houses had a 
price premium of up to £630,000 above the rest of the county. Similarly, 
research by Stirling Ackroyd found that house prices close to the excellent 
Queen Elizabeth’s School in Barnet were 34 per cent above the average for the 
area.
3. Genes
Professor Robert Plomin is a researcher at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology 
and Neuroscience, King’s College London. He has looked at the genes and life 
histories of 10,000 twin pairs born 1994–96, some of whom were identical, some 
not, some brought up by the same parents, some not. In 2018 he published a book, 
Blueprint,32 which summarises his research findings so far.
In recent years we have seen large-scale availability of genomic data. Scientists 
now know that the genetic influence over our personalities arises from thousands 
of tiny variations in our DNA, rather than one or a few genes alone. So most traits 
are ‘polygenic’ – that is, influenced by many genes.
Plomin finds that school attainment is better forecast by a polygenic score than 
any other way of predicting it – it is better than knowing how the parents did at 
school, better than socio-economic status, better than knowing the type of school. 
Our families and schools account for less than 5% of differences between us in 
terms of mental health or how well we did at school once we control for the impact 
of genes.
Most measures of the ‘environment’ show substantial genetic influence 
because people adapt their environment better to suit their natures. For example, 
Plomin discovered that the amount of television adopted children watch correlates 
twice as well with the amount their biological parents watch rather than with the 
amount watched by their adoptive parents. Children respond differently to the 
opportunities presented by school, and this is in part genetic.
31 Sutton Trust, (2019), Selective Comprehensives: Great Britain.
32 Plomin, R. (2018), Blueprint: How DNA makes us who we are, Allen Lane.
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Incredibly, Plomin concludes that children growing up in the same family are 
no more similar than children growing up in different families, if you correct for 
their genetic similarities. If you were cloned and your clone was raised by another 
family and went to another school, the clone would still be very similar to you in 
terms of personality and academic ability.
What does this mean for social mobility? On average children from low-income 
backgrounds have lower academic ability as measured by IQ tests, so genes clearly 
act as a brake on social mobility. Talent is not evenly spread – there are more 
talented people in some parts of the country than others. But the ability range is 
quite wide within each social class, so there are clearly many bright but 
disadvantaged children who could do better at school with the right help. And in 
any case, for any individual genes are not destiny. If you are less intelligent than 
some of your friends you can still do better than them at school by working harder. 
If you are more prone to being overweight than your contemporaries you just need 
to eat less and exercise more than them.
4. House prices
House price inflation has clearly created intergenerational inequality, with young 
people much less able to afford to buy housing than their parents and grandparents 
were at a similar age. The fact that wealthier parents are able to pass some of their 
wealth down to their children so they can buy a house widens the gap between the 
social classes.
5. Income
Children from better off families tend to go to better schools because house prices 
are higher near better schools. Children from richer backgrounds are also more 
likely to have private tuition, even if they go to state schools. In the early years, 
children from poorer backgrounds are less likely to attend good quality childcare 
or early education, partly because there is less good quality childcare available in 
poorer areas.
Children and parents who live in poor quality or overcrowded housing have 
worse physical and mental health. They are more likely to move house frequently, 
which has a very negative impact on children’s attainment. Educational resources 
such as a computer and a room of one’s own are expensive. Poverty also affects 
families through stress and a higher risk of depression, making it much more 
difficult for parents to support their children’s education.
In addition to financial and economic disadvantages, children from poorer 
backgrounds are also disadvantaged by a lack of cultural and social capital – they 
are less likely to visit museums, go abroad or read books.
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Families where both parents are educated spend an average of 110 minutes a 
day on educational activities with young children, compared to 71 minutes where 
parents have a low level of education.
By the time that students receive their GCSE results, around 32 per cent of the 
variation in performance can be predicted on the basis of indicators observed at or 
before age five (Washbrook, 2010).33
Nevertheless, Saunders (2019), in a review of the research evidence, concludes 
that the main reason that children from lower-income families do worse in exams 
is that they have lower academic ability on average. The effect of ability is at least 
three times greater than the impact of their home and parents.
6. Aspiration
There is some evidence that there is a general ‘culture of low aspirations’ among 
low-income families. The Millennium Cohort Study shows that the mothers of 
seven-year-olds have almost universally high aspirations for them – 97 per cent 
of both poorer and richer mothers say they want their child to go to university. 
However, children and parents from poorer backgrounds develop lower expecta-
tions as children grow older. They may still aspire to higher education and 
professional jobs, but their faith in their ability to achieve those ambitions is 
eroded.
This can arise from a combination of factors: lower achievement at school so 
far, a lack of social networks to provide knowledge and encouragement about how 
to achieve such goals, and a labour market with high numbers of low-skilled jobs 
and limited opportunities to use qualifications to progress from those to better 
work. In addition, where parents themselves have not had good experiences in 
education, and have few qualifications, they may have limited knowledge, 
confidence and skills in helping their children in education such as reading to 
them and helping with homework.
The Sutton Trust report, Believing in Better, June 2016,34 showed that one 
reason so many more girls go to university than boys is that they are much more 
likely to believe in the importance of a university degree. Even in Year 9, 65 per 
cent of girls said it was important to go to university compared to 58 per cent of 
boys. 15- and 16-year-olds with similar GCSE results were twice as likely to go on 
to do three A-levels if they saw university as a likely goal for them. Disadvantaged 
students were less likely to think they would go on to university than their more 
33 Washbrook, E. (2010) Early Environments and Child Outcomes: An Analysis, 
Commission for the Independent Review on Poverty and Life Chances.
34 Sutton Trust, (2016), Believing in Better.
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advantaged peers, with only 27 per cent having high aspirations compared with 
39 per cent of their better-off peers.
University entry rates are particularly low for White British pupils who were 
eligible for free school meals, at 18.5% for females and 12.8% for males in 2018 
(DfE, 2019, Widening Participation in Higher Education, England).35 This is not 
only due to poverty – other ethnic groups with the same low incomes are much 
more likely to go to university. It is also poverty of aspiration.
7. Soft skills once in the workplace
The Social Mobility Commission has shown that bright children from poor homes 
do well but never reach the highest income levels of their peers from wealthier 
homes. This may be due to a relative lack of useful soft skills. This has been 
analysed by Ashley et al. (2015),36 and the soft skills they identified included 
confidence, risk-taking, the ability to speak well, accent, team working, being 
organised and punctual.
8. Networks and fitting in
Mike Savage’s analysis of the Great British Class Survey (Savage, 2015)37 found that 
those whose parents work in professional occupations were much more likely to 
know other people in such occupations, and this gave them access to networks of 
influence, networks which made it more likely they would be able to access such jobs.
In 2016 the Social Mobility Commission38 published research evidence that 
explained why young people from disadvantaged homes may struggle to become 
investment bankers. They find it harder to acquire work experience because they 
lack the necessary informal networks. They found that managers often selected 
candidates who fitted the traditional image of an investment banker and displayed 
polish in areas such as speech, accent and dress. They noted that this can 
disadvantage candidates whose upbringing and background means they are simply 
not aware of such things as City dress codes.
35 Department for Education, (2019), Widening Participation in Higher Education, 
England.
36 Ashley, L., Duberley, J., Sommerlad, H. & Schlarios, D. (2015) A qualitative evaluation 
of non-educational barriers to the elite professions. London: Social Mobility and Child 
Poverty Commission
37 Savage, M. (2015), Social class in the 21st century, Pelican.
38 Social Mobility Commission, (2016), State of the Nation 2016: social mobility in Great 
Britain.
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WOULD ABOLISHING PRIVATE SCHOOLS IMPROVE  
SOCIAL MOBILITY?
Not much. Most social segregation within the school system happens within the 
state sector, where there is selection by house price. State schools in England are 
rapidly improving and many now have exam results which match private schools.
In any case, education is not the key to unlocking social mobility. Social 
mobility can only happen if there are enough good jobs. As things stand, you can 
go to a good school and go to a good university but still find yourself doing a job 
that was typically done by non-graduates twenty years ago.
The only sustained period of social mobility in this country was in the 1950s 
to 1980s. The doyen of sociologists, Professor John Goldthorpe, is clear that this 
did not have much to do with education. Much more important was the national 
economy: the growth of white-collar jobs including far more jobs for women.
So what is needed is economic growth and investment in infrastructure, as the 
experience of China in the past 20 years has shown, where incidentally social 
mobility has been weak but almost everyone is much richer. The best thing for the 
white working class of coastal towns or NE England or Knowsley, places often 
cited as suffering from educational underachievement, is not in fact just improving 
schools, which at best will mean the out-migration of ambitious and intelligent 
young people – like Justine Greening, who often cited her success at school as the 
thing which allowed her to ‘escape’ Rotherham and come to London.
No, we don’t want a system which drives successful people out of depressed 
areas. We need jobs in those places, and that means we need investment and even 
the sort of state intervention that attracted car plants from Japan to the north-east 
of England under Margaret Thatcher, providing thousands of jobs, tens of 
thousands through the multiplier, providing training for local people, improving 
regional incomes and stemming out-migration. Nothing much to do with schools.
Any objective review of the state of education in England today must 
conclude that the main issue is not the unfairly good A-level results of a few 
thousand pupils from wealthier homes, a good proportion of whom would in fact 
get very good results wherever they went to school. No, the problem is the long 
tail of underachievement, especially amongst boys, who seemly learn little in 
the five years they are in secondary school. Every inter-country comparison 
shows that this is the main issue we have. White working-class boys will not be 
helped a jot by the abolition of private schools. What their schools need is strong 
heads and effective teachers who stay. And to get that we need a system which 
pays the teachers in struggling areas more than teachers elsewhere, something 
which governments have been reluctant to consider but which is entirely in their 
hands.
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In terms of social mobility, what really matters is the 50% who don’t go to 
university. These are the half of the population who now matter most, but you 
don’t read about them in the newspapers because, they tell me, ‘these things don’t 
interest our readers’.
We must stop talking about social mobility as if it was all about the top 1%. 
What the 50% who don’t go to university want is to earn a good living. What 
drives incomes is productivity – how much we produce per person per hour. 
Productivity in the UK has been static and low since 2007, one of the longest 
periods of stagnation in history.
To improve productivity we need to invest in training and technology. Training 
of this sort does not happen in schools, it happens in firms and FE colleges. We 
have been struggling to get this sort of training right since the 1867 Paris 
Exhibition.
The number one issue is the coming dominance of Asia in the world in terms 
of population and economy, education and innovation. The idea that eradicating a 
few dozen well-known schools will enable us to compete with East Asia is 
nonsense.
And if your main concern is the wealth gap in England, surely the answer is 
changes to income tax, not fiddling around with schools?
A BIT OF AN OBSESSION
Many politicians today seem to believe that education is no longer only about 
helping individual children learn as much as possible of those things that adults 
deem important, but is equally about social justice, social mobility, equity and 
equality of opportunity. That is what the comprehensive system, that is what the 
EBacc and that is what the Office for Students are all about. A belief which now 
encourages many system leaders to say that the main purpose of education is to 
get children from poorer homes up to the academic standards achieved by 
middle-income children. It is as much about equity as national standards. So the 
Education Select Committee Chair, Robert Halfon MP, could say: ‘Tackling social 
injustice is the central objective of the Education Committee.’ Not an objective, 
note. This is what many politicians and education leaders believe.
ARE THERE ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRYING TO IMPROVE 
SOCIAL MOBILITY?
Even the poorest people in Britain today are far better off than middle-income 
people 50 years ago, and the best way to help those at the bottom is to generate 
more jobs and more higher-paid jobs. Focusing on inequality is dangerous, because 
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you are focusing on the wrong thing and risk compromising the main task – 
improving the economy.
In education a concern about performance gaps between advantaged and 
disadvantaged children may be diverting energy from a more important 
consideration – raising the education level of all children in England in the face of 
growing international competition. Social mobility policies can have other 
damaging side-effects. For example, dilution of academic standards to allow more 
candidates to pass exams, as happened with the GCSE, led to less stretch for the 
top 50% of the ability range.
There is growing evidence that the increase in numbers of students from 
low-income homes going to low-tariff universities has not improved their 
employment prospects while leaving them with debt.
All parents want is a good school locally. Not choice. Not social mobility. Just 
a good school with effective discipline and great teachers. Yet Dominic Cummings 
could write, albeit a bit unfairly: ‘Most of those with power in the English education 
system are much more interested in appearing to be “on the side of the poor and 
less able” than they are in raising standards.’
In 2016 Theresa May talked about the need to create a meritocracy. She said 
that the only thing which should ‘count’ in terms of success in life was innate 
ability and capacity for hard work.
But Michael Young, when he wrote The Rise of the Meritocracy, was fearful 
of the concept, because if society is organised as a meritocracy then there is a 
danger that those at the top will feel they deserve their status and by the same 
token those at the bottom deserve theirs. Sympathy for the poor evaporates: they 
are poor because their lowly intelligence made them that way.
So there are those who think that a more meritocratic society will not result in 
social mobility, far from it, because meritocracy entrenches the privileges of the 
cognitive elite.
FINALLY
Social mobility is at the heart of every debate about education, most recently the 
Office for Students consultation on university admissions reform (2019).39 Yet this 
is a very particular, middle-class Londoner way of looking at the world. Quite 
apart from anything, not everyone wants to be socially mobile, especially if it 
means leaving home and family for some distant city. What most people want is a 
39 Office for Students, (2019), Consultation on the higher education admissions system in 
England.
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decent income and good health. I do not especially aspire to be better than my 
parents.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric about social mobility, half the population will 
always have below-average academic ability and school exam results. But if we are 
to overcome the divisions in society revealed by recent political events, all need to 
feel valued. That is why we must get back to a more balanced appreciation of those 
who perform essential jobs, albeit jobs of the hand or heart rather than academic 
intellect. We should stop talking about social mobility as simply a way of ‘rescuing’ 
people from working-class backgrounds and place more emphasis on valuing the 
full range of worthwhile occupations. Arguments about social mobility are too 
often based on exam results or incomes, not the value to society of different 
occupations.
In any case, by many measures social mobility in the UK is better than most 
commentators like to suggest. The upward mobility of women and almost all 
ethnic groups since 1970 has been remarkable. The problem today is that to get on 
young people often have to get out – they have to fly south.
Improving education is not enough. Education helps individuals become 
socially mobile but does not overall create more mobility: only an increase in 
middle-class jobs does that.
So the best way to improve social mobility is by expanding the economy, to 
use infrastructure projects and financial incentives to spread growth outside the 
south-east of England, allied to a massive expansion of high-quality technical and 
vocational training for the 50% who do not go to university. If you want social 
mobility, that is how you will get it.
